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 Soon after I was appointed to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 2000, I attended a 
two-week session for new appellate court judges at the National Judicial College in Reno, 
Nevada.  Among the speakers was former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny 
White, who spoke about the need to consider how language used in opinions is 
understood by the public.  She related her experience of losing her retention election in 
1996 in the wake of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s controversial decision reversing a 
death sentence.  Justice White pointed out that some language used in the opinion--for 
example, stating that the murder of a grandmother wasn’t “cruel”—was misunderstood 
and prompted misplaced outrage.  Justice White’s message was to be careful with word 
choices.  My take-away was that Justices could be fired for doing their jobs if the public 
is unhappy with a single opinion.  Having just surrendered a lucrative law practice to 
take the bench, Justice White’s cautionary tale was chilling. 
As the years progressed and I found myself deciding publicly controversial cases, 
the ghost of Justice White’s retention loss occasionally hovered in my peripheral vision, 
taking more definite shape at times – for example when three Iowa Supreme Court 
Justices lost their retention elections in 2010 following a divisive same-sex marriage 
decision.  But whenever that menace reappeared, I consciously, and hopefully 
successfully, banished it by considering the importance of adhering to my oath of office, 
preserving my integrity, and reminding myself that the worst thing that could happen is 
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that I would be voted out of office and forced to return to the practice of law with my 
head held high. 
As organized campaigns against state Supreme Court1 Justices have increased in 
recent years, particularly with the proliferation of dark money contributions and social 
media, I have pondered the effect on sitting Justices.  Ask people what they desire in a 
Justice and they most likely say something that suggests a fair and independent decision-
maker.  But do our judicial re-selection methods pressure Justices to consider their 
personal welfare when making decisions at the cost of independence? 
This paper does not focus on reforming existing methods for re-selecting state 
Supreme Court Justices.  Rather, I seek to add to our knowledge of how current re-
selection systems affect sitting Justices.  After an historical overview of how the states 
choose to select and retain Supreme Court Justices, I hypothesize that the re-selection 
methods—elections and reappointments—imposed on most Justices tempt them to act 
strategically to maximize their prospects of maintaining their positions.  To test this 
hypothesis, I gathered anecdotal evidence from confidential interviews conducted with 
sitting and retired state Supreme Court Justices and federal court judges who formerly 
served in state courts.  To further test the hypothesis, I also propose as a sub-hypothesis 
that Justices concerned with re-selection act strategically in dissenting or specially 
concurring.  To test this sub-hypothesis, I examine two empirical measures:  (1) Justices’ 
                                                          
1 Texas and Oklahoma have two courts of last resort, one for civil appeals and one for 
criminal appeals.  Other states have courts of appeals as courts of last resort.  For ease of 
reference, I refer to each court of last resort as a “Supreme Court.”  See 
https://ballotpedia.org/Court_of_last_resort (last visited December 14, 2017). 
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dissent and special concurrence rates the year before a re-selection event as compared 
with the rate the year after; and (2) Justices’ criminal dissent and special concurrence rates 
the year before a re-selection event as compared with the rate the year following re-
selection. 
I.  Balancing judicial independence with democratic 
accountability:  an historical overview 
 
 The Eighteenth Century American colonists so resented King George III’s exercise 
of power to appoint and remove judges that the Declaration of Independence lists as a 
grievance that the King “has made judges depend on his will alone, for the tenure of their 
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”2  To protect judicial 
independence, the framers of the United States Constitution empowered the President to 
appoint federal judges, with Senate approval, for lifetime tenures.3  Likewise, the 
majority of states provided lifetime appointments for judges, constrained only by the 
requirement of good behavior.4  Judicial elections were rare during the country’s 
fledgling years.5 
                                                          
2 Grodin, Joseph R., Developing a Consensus of Constraint:  A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial 
Retention Elections, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1969, 1970 (1988). 
3 O’Connor, Sandra Day & Jones, RonNell Andersen, Reflections on Arizona’s Judicial 
Selection Process 50 Ariz. L. Rev. Vol. 16 (Spring 2008). 
4 Grodin, supra note 2, at 1970.  In the original thirteen states, either the legislature or the 
governor appointed the judges.  Johnsen, Diane M., Building a Bench:  A Close Look at State 
Appellate Courts Constructed by the Respective Methods of Judicial Selection, 53 San Diego L. 
Rev. 829, 836 (Fall 2016). 
5 O’Connor & Jones, supra note 3, at 16. 
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 In a wave of populist sentiment, states turned to electing judges in the first half of 
the 1800s, believing that elected judges would be more accountable to the public than 
appointed judges.6  Jacksonian populism fizzled, but more states turned to electing 
judges in the mid-1800s “based on the theory that ‘elected judges who derived their 
authority from the people would be more independent-minded than hand-picked friends 
of governors or jurists subject to the beck and call of the legislature.”7  These reforms were 
largely successful, and by the start of the Civil War, the majority of states elected their 
judges.8 
 The pendulum swung away from electing judges in the first part of the 1900s with 
the advent of the “merit selection” system for selecting judges.9  Reformers had become 
concerned that electing judges did not result in seating legally competent jurists and gave 
political party bosses the power to “hand pick” successful judicial candidates, thereby 
threatening their independence.10  Roscoe Pound expressed this dissatisfaction in a 
                                                          
6 Id.  Georgia became the first state to use elections to select judges when it amended its 
constitution in 1812.  Id.  
7 Id. at 16-17, quoting Geyh, Charles Gardner, An Overview of State Judicial Selection Systems 
and Their Relationship to Judicial Independence, in Sandra Day O’Connor Project on the State 
of the Judiciary, Background Papers for 2007 Conference: The Debate Over Judicial 
Elections and State Court Judicial Selection, 7 (Georgetown Law, 2007).  
8 Id. at 17. 
9 Id. Albert Kales, co-founder of the American Judicature Society, is credited with 
proposing what is now known as “merit selection” in 1914.  White, Penny J. & Reddick, 
Malia, A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick:  The Rest of the Story, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 501, 535 
(2008).  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) passed a resolution favoring merit 
selection in 1937, and in 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt the plan.  Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Judicial Selection:  The Process of Choosing Judges 4 (June 2008).  Consequently, “merit 
selection” is often referred to as “the Missouri Plan.”  Id. at 4-5. 
10 O’Connor & Jones, supra note 3, at 17.  
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speech to the ABA in 1906:  “Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become 
politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the 
bench.”11 
In a typical merit selection system, an independent citizen commission 
recommends several candidates and, from this pool, the Governor appoints a judge.12  
After a period of time, voters decide whether the judge should be retained in office.13  
Thereafter, the judge runs for reelection at regular intervals in uncontested retention 
elections.14  Merit selection gained steam in the 1960s, 1970s, and the early 1980s.15  Most 
states using a form of merit selection today implemented the process during this time 
frame.16 
Today, twenty-one states select Justices through partisan17 or non-partisan 
elections,18 although Justices may be appointed to fill mid-term vacancies.  The remaining 
twenty-nine states19 and the District of Columbia use a form of merit selection, 
                                                          
11 White & Reddick, supra note 9, at 535. 
12 O’Connor & Jones, supra note 3, at 17. 
13 Id. 
14 Johnsen, supra note 4, at 837. 
15 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 9, at 5.   
16 Id. 
17 Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas. 
18 Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin.  New Mexico’s system is unique.  After a Justice is elected in a partisan 
election, the Justice thereafter runs periodically in retention elections. 
19 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.   
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gubernatorial appointment, or legislative appointment to initially select Justices for their 
Supreme Courts.    Only a handful of states provide lifetime or near-lifetime tenures for 
Justices, subject to good behavior requirements.20  Sitting Justices in the remaining states 
and the District of Columbia must be reappointed or run in retention, partisan, or non-
partisan elections.  (For ease of reference, I collectively refer to reappointment, retention 
elections, and partisan and non-partisan re-elections as “re-selection” or “re-selection 
events.”  Unless otherwise noted, I also include the District of Columbia within the 
meaning of “state” or “states.”) 
The variety of systems currently used by the states reflects a lack of consensus 
about the best way to choose Supreme Court Justices.  Indiana University at Bloomington 
Law School Professor Charles Gardner Geyh, a scholar on courts, has suggested that 
“[c]onsensus on the optimal method of judicial selection has been elusive” because “the 
objective of a good selection system – an optimal balance between judicial independence 
and accountability – is an ever-moving target that generates perennial calls for reform.”21  
And as West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Larry V. Starcher noted in pressing for 
partisan judicial elections:  “[T]he issue is not whether there will be politics in the judicial 
selection process, for the selection of judges always has been and always will be political. 
                                                          
20 Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island provide lifetime tenure or tenure 
until a specific age.  In New Jersey, the Governor can confer lifetime tenure after the 
Justice has served seven years after appointment. 
21 Geyh, Charles Gardner, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial 
Independence, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1259, 1263-64 (Fall 2008). 
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The issue is: what sort of politics? The politics of the few--or the politics of the many?”22  
The debate generally focuses on how to preserve judicial independence while holding 
Justices democratically accountable.23     
II.  The Modern Reality:  Turning up the pressure on sitting 
Justices 
 
 A consistent goal of all judicial selection and re-selection systems is a desire to 
procure and retain judges who independently exercise judgment to interpret and apply 
the law and yet remain accountable for their performances.24  Since the 1980s, however, 
these systems have become increasingly politicized as special interest groups grasped 
that “investing in judicial races—often by funding ads urging voters to hold judges 
accountable for rulings in controversial cases – is an inexpensive way to shape policy:  
cheaper than lobbying, cheaper than supporting the campaigns of governors and state 
                                                          
22 Delligatti, Anthony J., A Horse of a Different Color:  Distinguishing the Judiciary from the 
Political Branches in Campaign Financing, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 401, 413 (2012).  
23 Bonica, Adam and Woodruff, Michael J., State Supreme Court Ideology and 'New Style' 
Judicial Campaigns at 2-3 (October 31, 2012) (“The diversity of electoral arrangement is in 
part reflective [sic] reform efforts to tailor judicial elections in order to balance electoral 
accountability and maintaining impartiality and legitimacy of the state courts.  Yet the 
practical effects of many popular judicial reforms are not fully understood.”).  Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2169664 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2169664  
24 Kowal, John F., New Ideas for a New Democracy:  Judicial Selection for the 21st Century, 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, p. 4 (2016).  Available 
at:  https://www.brennancnter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Judicial_Selection_21st_Century.pdf Democracy; Delligatti, supra note 22, at p. 414.  
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legislators.”25  As one Ohio AFL-CIO official phrased it, “We figured out a long time ago 
that it’s easier to elect seven judges than to elect 132 legislators.”26 
Money has progressively poured into judicial elections.  A series of United States 
Supreme Court decisions starting with Citizens United v. FEC have permitted “dark 
money” to fund attack ads on sitting Justices and reined in efforts to protect publicly 
financed candidates from being outspent.27  “From 2000-2009, state supreme court 
candidates raised $206.9 million, more than doubling the $83.3 million raised in the prior 
decade.”28  In 2013-14 alone, spending in eighteen state Supreme Court elections 
exceeded $34.5 million.29   Retention elections, once considered non-political, have 
become battlegrounds in some states for special interest groups and partisan politics.  As 
noted by Scott Greytak from Justice at Stake: 
[I]n a handful of states, retention campaigns have become intense, high-
profile, and expensive—frequently in response to a decision in a 
controversial case or when there is an opportunity to change the ideological 
composition of a court.  Average per seat spending in retention elections in 
2009-14 reflects a tenfold increase from the average over the previous eight 
years.  Overall, nearly $6.5 million was spent on retention races in three 
states in 2013-14.  . . . .  The trend puts new pressures on judges who had 
previously been largely insulated from politicized judicial elections.”30 
 
                                                          
25 Id. at 5. 
26 Delligatti, supra note 22, at 432. 
27 Kowal, supra note 24, at 8. 
28 Delligatti, supra note 22, at 432. 
29 Greytak, Scott ET AL., Bankrolling the Bench:  The New Politics of Judicial 
Elections 2013-14, at 2 (Laurie Kinney ed., 2015).  Available at:  
http://newpoliticsreport.org/report/2013-14 
30 Id. at 4. 
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 In highly publicized accounts, Justices have been unseated for making unpopular 
decisions.  In 1986, three California Supreme Court Justices, including Chief Justice Rose 
Bird, lost their retention elections in the face of a campaign primarily organized around 
their opposition to the death penalty and the California Governor’s criticism of Chief 
Justice Bird as anti-business.31  Ten years later, Justice Penny White lost her retention 
election in Tennessee because the Tennessee Supreme Court unanimously overturned a 
death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.32  In a 2004 partisan election, 
Justice Warren McGraw lost his bid to remain on the West Virginia Supreme Court after 
a large coal company CEO launched a $3 million campaign to defeat McGraw because of 
past votes favoring plaintiffs.33  McGraw’s defeat was partially due to an unpopular vote 
he cast in a criminal case.34  And in 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court Justices lost their 
retention elections following a successful campaign against them funded by those 
opposed to the Court’s unanimous 2009 ruling in favor of same-sex marriage equality.35 
 These examples represent a miniscule percentage of re-selection events held over 
the same time period and can be overlooked as aberrant.  But have they planted seeds of 
concern in Justices’ minds that sprout when potentially unpopular decisions loom?  After 
Justice White’s defeat, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist suggested it should, 
                                                          
31 Kowal, supra note 24, at 10. 
32 Id. 
33 Geyh, Charles Gardner, Judicial Selection Reconsidered:  A Plea for Radical Moderation, 35 
Harv. J.O. & Pub. Pol’y 623, 631-32 (Spring 2012). 
34 Id. at 634. 
35 Kowal, supra note 24, at 12. 
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commenting: “Should a judge look over his shoulder to the next election in determining 
how to rule on a case?  I hope so.  I hope so.”36  Professor Geyh summarized the concern: 
If we accept the proposition that judges must be independent enough to 
respect the due process rights of parties, administer justice in situation 
specific contexts, and apply the law as they understand it to be written, then 
putting judges at risk of losing their jobs for making a choice in an isolated 
case summarized for voters in advertising campaigns is troublesome.37  
        
In the wake of losing his retention election in 1986, former California Supreme 
Court Associate Justice Joseph R. Grodin wrote that the election rhetoric, which criticized 
the Justices’ votes on death penalty cases, sent a message to judges that if they want to 
keep their jobs, they should decide cases according to popular view.38  Grodin cautioned 
as follows: 
The risk that judges will receive and act upon that message, unconsciously 
if not consciously, is substantial.  Justice Otto Kaus, my former colleague on 
the California Supreme Court, has candidly stated in public that he cannot 
be sure whether his vote on an important case in 1982 may have been 
influenced subconsciously by his awareness that the outcome could affect 
his chances in the retention election being conducted that year.  I would 
have to say that the same is true of my votes in critical cases during 1986; I 
just can’t be sure.39 
 
In short, pressure on state Supreme Court Justices has ratcheted up in recent years.  
Scholarship, largely focused on the United States Supreme Court, has suggested that 
Justices are “strategic actors” who are influenced in their decisions by internal and 
                                                          
36 Id. at 10 
37 Id. at 12 




external factors.40  States must confront whether their methods for re-selecting Supreme 
Court Justices, with the associated threat of being unseated for making unpopular 
decisions, serve as external influences on the Justices’ independence in decision making. 
III.  Findings and analysis 
 
Hypothesis:  The re-selection methods—elections and 
reappointments—imposed on most state Supreme Court 
Justices tempt them to act strategically to maximize their 
prospects of maintaining their positions. 
 
A.  The interviews 
 
To examine whether and to what extent re-selection events affect sitting state 
Supreme Court Justices in decision-making, I turned to the source:  sitting Justices.  As 
one myself, I hoped I would enjoy sufficient credibility that Justices would feel 
comfortable having candid discussions.  Overwhelmingly, that appeared to be the case.  
Still, as scholars have warned, although stories are a valuable insight into how people 
think about a topic, they might not tell us how those people act.41  Caution is also 
                                                          
40 As explained by Epstein and Knight:  “[J]ustices may be primarily seekers of legal 
policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on their 
own ideological attitudes.  Rather, Justices are strategic actors who realize their ability to 
achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the 
choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act.”  
Epstein, Lee & Knight, Jack, The Choices Justices Make, 10 (CQ Press 1998) 
41 George, Tracey E., Gulati, Mitu, & McGinley, Ann C., The New Old Legal Realism (2011). 
Scholarly Works. Paper 173.  Available at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/173 
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warranted as the interviewer—me—is a peer of the Justices interviewed and is therefore 
inherently biased.  Thus, despite my best efforts to be objective, my observations may be 
colored by my own views. 
  1.  Methodology 
 
There are 351 state Supreme Court Justices.42  I sought to interview at least ten 
percent culled from different re-selection systems, different areas of the United States, 
and from states with both large and small populations.  I interviewed thirty-seven sitting 
Justices (10.75% of currently serving Justices) and seven former Justices, one of whom 
was also retired from a federal court bench, from twenty-five states.  Twenty Justices are 
from states with partisan or non-partisan elections, eighteen are from states with 
retention elections or retention by a government authority, and two are from states with 
no re-selection processes.  To gain a slightly different perspective, I also interviewed four 
sitting federal judges who formerly served as state court judges or Justices.43 
I identified who to contact for an interview in a few ways.  I initially contacted and 
interviewed Justices I know.  During some of those interviews, Justices volunteered to 
contact others on my behalf.  I also emailed Justices randomly asking for interviews.  And 
one Justice contacted me after hearing I had interviewed his colleague.  My initial contact 
with all Justices was through an email explaining my research topic, asking for an 
                                                          
42 https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts (last visited December 14, 2017); 
https://ballotpedia.org/District_of_Columbia_Court_of_Appeals (last visited 
December 14, 2017) 
43 I obtained IRB approval for all interviews. 
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interview, and promising confidentiality.  I contacted seventy-two Justices/federal 
judges and interviewed forty-four, meaning 61% agreed to an interview.  Two others 
expressed interest in being interviewed, but we were unable to schedule a convenient 
time; another Justice sent me an email explaining her views on my topic.  The rest either 
politely declined or did not respond. 
Most interviews were telephonic but a few took place in person.  After reiterating 
my thesis topic and the confidential nature of any comments, I asked the same questions 
of all Justices, with slight alterations due to differences in re-selection systems.  I also 
posed somewhat different questions to the federal judges.  And sometimes the answers 
prompted follow-up questions.  The interviews ranged from twenty to ninety minutes, 
with most lasting around thirty minutes.  I did not record the interviews but 
simultaneously took notes, meaning some of my quotes might be imperfect but not 
substantively so. 
Nearly all the Justices/judges were comfortable and forthcoming, more so as the 
interviews progressed.  A significant number expressed relief when I emphasized that I 
would not identify them by name or court or report any facts that would identify their 
courts.  They put their trust in my promise, to my great appreciation, which likely 
increased their candor.  The Justices based their opinions on both their own experiences 
and on conversations with colleagues and peers in other states.  As I report below, some 
common themes emerged.  For ease of reading, and to protect confidentiality, I use 
masculine pronouns when referring to the Justices regardless of their gender.  And unless 





2.  Common themes 
 
Although each Justice expressed his own opinion about the influence of re-
selection events on deciding cases, some common themes emerged. 
a.  Re-selection pressures exist but don’t typically affect 
how Justices vote in cases 
 
All Justices were initially asked whether the prospect of a Justice losing a re-
selection bid impacts decision making.  Most Justices said “no” but recognized that 
Justices facing re-selection naturally worry about being unseated.  As one Justice 
observed, the influence of elections on state Supreme Court Justices is “subtle” as “no one 
is going to say, ‘if I rule one way I won’t be reelected.’  But in private conversations, 
judges will express concern about being reelected.”  Another in a retention state said that 
“Justices feel safe until shortly before the retention . . . [t]hen anxiety sets in and you start 
to worry about a number of things including retention.”  Indeed, almost all Justices in 
their last terms and retired Justices reported feeling worry-free after their last re-selection 
event (“I heaved a sigh of relief;” “It takes the load off when deciding high-profile cases”).   
But does this anxiety affect votes?  “I’ve never seen it,” said one Justice, summing up the 
majority view. 
Several Justices accepted that re-selection pressures are simply part of the job and 
must therefore be taken in stride.  As one put it, “[p]olitics are so nasty, dirty, awful, that 
15 
 
if someone wants to find a decision to use against you in an election, they will.  So don’t 
worry about it.”  A Justice in a partisan-election state acknowledged that he thinks about 
how a decision will impact his constituents (“I do know what groups helped me.  I’m 
mindful of it”) but has not voted on a case to further his constituents’ interests.  This 
sentiment was echoed by a Justice in a retention-election state:  “We’ve had two 
contentious retention elections here [centered on the Justices’ ideology].  It hasn’t 
changed our thinking about decisions, but it has caused concerns about the future.” 
Some Justices gave examples of the types of pressures brought to bear.  One Justice 
in a retention-election state related that after his Court decided a case against the 
Governor who had appointed him and another colleague, the Governor’s office contacted 
them to let them know they were disappointed with the decision.  “I thought this was 
highly inappropriate.”  Another Justice recalled that concerns about re-selection entered 
his mind when legislators on one side of a case came as a group to sit in the front row of 
oral argument and stare at the Court, although he was more concerned with how the 
outcome would affect court funding.   
A minority of Justices admitted that the prospect of being re-selected affects votes 
in cases.  One Justice explained: 
I have been surprised by that revelation.  I have been surprised by some of 
the language used by my colleagues when discussing how the outcome of 
the decision would impact elections and how that’s part of their 
consideration in making decisions.  I researched the issue independently 
because I wondered about it and was and am concerned. 
 




I think it’s always in the Justice’s mind.  You can’t take politics out of 
anything whether you get to the court through election or appointment, and 
it depends on the politics of the state and how Justices are selected.  . . . I’m 
mindful of the groups of people who supported me and the people who are 
in my district.  I feel I’m as pure as anyone because I was supported by 
everyone with no opposition.  But still, I am mindful of politics.  I want to 
know how the decision is going to make the court and judiciary as a whole 
look; how does the decision square with my philosophy and what I ran on?  
I’m a Republican and I can issue the most liberal decisions and have no 
consequence.  But I won’t.  If someone says politics don’t enter into it, 
they’re lying. 
 
One Justice didn’t hesitate to say, “you bet” re-selection makes a difference and “[a]lmost 
everyone is in denial about it.”  And a Justice in a partisan-election state described 
political maneuvering at his Court but was uncertain whether it stemmed from personal 
desires to be re-elected: 
When in practice, I never thought about political games being played at the 
Court.  No one ever talked about politics [when I served on] the court of 
appeals.  The Supreme Court is not so constrained by precedent.  In my 
early tenure, some Justices were sharply partisan.  It could have been 
ideological rather than as a matter of following a party position.  In the last 
four or five years, when the legislature started to issue laws that were 
challenged on constitutionality [the votes in some cases split along party 
lines].  
 
No Justice said he had ever voted on a case in a way to appease the public.  But 
even among the Justices who had never seen others do so, many believed it has 
happened.  One Justice’s answer to the question of whether re-selection events affect 
decision making typified others: 
I think it can and it has and it will.  It doesn’t impact as often as people 
think.  I see a lot of judicial independence and courage on the part of Justices 
here.  There’s been a few times, less than five times, I stopped and thought 




Another Justice remarked that re-selection concerns “shouldn’t” impact decision making, 
“[b]ut human nature being what it is, it probably flits though Justices’ minds, particularly 
in big cases and in ones with publicity.  But for Justices trying to be neutral and impartial, 
it’s recognized but shouldn’t impact decision making.” 
 Some Justices said the impact of re-selection pressures depends on a state’s re-
selection method.  One Justice in a retention-election state remarked: 
Based on my discussions with other Justices from other states, I think 
[partisan and non-partisan] elections can definitely shape their decisions.  
In Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, opposition groups will use Justices’ 
opinions to go after them.  This is much less likely in a retention election 
unless there is a high profile controversial case like same-sex marriage out 
there. 
 
A Justice from another retention-election state echoed this view:  
Retention elections are below the radar and unless the Justice has done 
something egregiously wrong and has great publicity, chances of retention 
are high.  In states with contested elections, there are opponents who will 
use issues and decisions in the campaign.  By human nature, that would 
make the Justice somewhat leery and aware of how his opinions will play 
with the electorate. 
       
The Justices sitting in states with no re-selection methods took a “grass is always 
browner” view of the pressures put on Justices in other states.  As one answered when 
asked whether the decision-making process for Justices on his court would be different if 
he had to stand for retention or re-election: 
I don’t see how it could be otherwise, I really don’t.  That’s the problem 
with elections.  There is an inherent coercive effect; you’re always looking 
over your shoulder wanting to get elected or re-elected.  It you write 
opinions that the public doesn’t agree with, it affects you.  We’ve had to 
write controversial decisions, and if I had to worry about re-election, it 
would have been awful.  If I had to worry about being vilified by an 
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opposing party, it would have been awful.  It’s freeing being able to decide 
these matters without the personal worry. 
 
The federal judges likewise expressed concern about the impact of re-selection 
events.  When asked whether he felt less constrained in making decisions now compared 
to when he served in the state court system, one federal district court judge responded:  
“Absolutely.  I get a whole lot more press now, so everything I do is subject to much more 
coverage.  But I recall when I transferred over here, I remember feeling relieved.  And I 
didn’t even realize I had felt constrained.  But I did.”  He related that he could not have 
handled a contentious case involving a popular politician the same way had he been a 
state court judge.  “A state court judge would have been run from office, probably, with 
[the politician’s] supporters and war chest.  I got calls from people saying, ‘just wait for 
the election,’ not realizing they couldn’t affect me.”  All the other federal judges echoed 
this expression of relief from worry over re-selection.  As one said, in making decisions 
now, “[t]here isn’t in the background the possibility of losing your job.” 
A few Justices related that concerns about re-selection have impacted votes on 
whether to grant discretionary review in a case.  One explained: 
I don’t think it [re-selection concerns] impact our actual decisions because 
we rise above it.  But are we concerned about that when deciding whether 
to grant review?  Maybe.  I can’t say we don’t consider it.  If it’s something 
controversial like same-sex marriage, we might want to deny review or 
decide [the case] on a procedural issue to avoid deciding the merits.  We try 
to avoid the issue sometimes. 
       
Another Justice said he has “heard people say, ‘why grant review when all this is going 




b.  Justices combat pressures attendant to controversial 
cases by tapping a deep-seeded drive to “do the right 
thing” 
 
The question I posed that prompted the most thoughtful answers was whether the 
Justices considered how the outcome of a controversial case might affect their chances for 
re-selection and, if so, how they dealt with it. 
Most Justices said they were acutely aware of the controversial nature of pending 
decisions.  “It has to be a consideration; it has to enter your mind.  I am aware of media 
and social media,” said one Justice, echoing others’ comments.  Another noted, “I’m not 
oblivious to it.  One can’t close their mind to knowing that a decision will help or hurt in 
the re-election effort.” 
But others reported being oblivious to controversy.  “Ninety-nine percent of the 
time, I never thought what I was doing was controversial,” said one Justice, “so I can’t 
take credit for being brave as I thought I was being logical.”  Another Justice sheepishly 
chalked up his obliviousness to egotism:  “I was fairly arrogant in that respect.  I assumed 
that my decisions would be met with general approbation.”  And one Justice expressed 
surprise about the public’s negative reaction to his Court’s decision in a social-issue case:  
“I don’t remember consciously thing about it.  It floated through my mind that people 
would be unhappy.  I followed the law, the [issue] was clear cut, and we never talked 
about it being a problem for the [election].” 
Many Justices remarked they never considered how an unpopular vote might 
affect them (“Absolutely not;” “Not a whit;” “no”), but others recognized the threat and 
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disregarded it or embraced it (“You do think about it, but there is nothing wrong with 
that.  It makes you more scholarly [in your decisions]).”  To deal with perceived public 
pressure, these Justices spoke sincerely, and often passionately, about their desires to 
preserve the independence of the judiciary by ignoring personal concerns.  No one 
thought their actions extraordinary, just necessary for the greater good.  While listening 
to these comments, I couldn’t help but wish that a public often jaded by political scandals 
could know the hearts and minds of the men and women we’ve entrusted to lead our 
state judiciaries.  These comments by various Justices are emblematic:  
I was stubborn and wouldn’t cave into public pressure.  I knew I could 
make a living as a trial attorney.  Being idealistic in the sense of wanting to 
do the right thing isn’t being brave.  It’s not the same thing as being in Nazi 
Germany and facing being shot for not following the regime’s view; I’m not 
sure I could do that.  In the end, my refusal to yield to public pressure is a 
combination of wanting to do the right thing and being rebellious. 
 
. . . . 
 
It’s inconsistent with my job to be guided by that stuff [re-selection 
pressures].  I believe that being independent is the most important thing to 
being a judge.  If I wasn’t, I feel I would let all judges down. 
 
. . . . 
 
I deal with it with courage.  I push it out of my mind.  In part, too, because 
all judges have faced it.  We get strength from each other. 
 
. . . .  
 
I just remember my oath to steer clear of any influence.  I do what I need to 
do and think that even if I write something benign, someone can use that 
against me in the current media market.  Detractors can pull one quote or 
holding out of context and use it against me.  The majority of people voting 
won’t read my opinions.  It’s the lawyers and the judges below.  I just try to 




. . . . 
 
My grandma used to say you can’t keep birds from flying overhead but you 
can keep them from nesting in your hair. 
 
Many Justices also said they accepted that they could lose their jobs for making an 
unpopular decision but reassured themselves with the knowledge that they could make 
a living elsewhere.  One Justice shared his pragmatic view:   
How do I deal with the knowledge that I’m up for retention next year?  I 
think, “what’s the worst that can happen?”  I had a good run and I’ll go 
back to practice.  And I can look myself in the mirror.  Not even a close call.  
I would rather go down being true to myself and my profession than stay 
here and manufacture a position for fear of being thrown out. 
 
Justices also described what it was like to be challenged in re-selection events and 
how those experiences affected them.  One Justice recalled a challenge early in his judicial 
career: 
[A colleague] wrote [a controversial social issue] decision and I joined.  The 
Republican Party came after us both.  I raised money just from family and 
friends.  Very tough.  When I signed off on the case, I didn’t consider the 
consequences.  I had to travel all over the state and interview with 
newspapers.  So many people stepped up because they wanted to preserve 
judicial independence.  It was a distraction from my duties, but it was nice 
to meet people and it was good to preserve the system.  I wouldn’t want to 
do it again, though!  I was [easily retained].  In the next election, I did 
nothing to campaign and was retained with no problem. 
 
Another recounted being targeted by an outside group during his re-selection bid: 
A group went after me . . . based on a dissent in a case concerning . . . [a law 
about monitoring] sex offenders.  I had written . . . that the new law was 
[unconstitutional]. The group ran attack ads that played constantly, 
showing children on a playground and saying ‘Justice [X] sides with child 
molesters.’  It was funded by dark money.  The ad was so over the top that 
people were outraged.  I was interviewed by the media about it a half-dozen 
times.  I won by the largest margin I had ever had. . . . Despite this 
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experience, I don’t do things differently.  I thought before my first election 
that you just have to be an independent decision maker.  If you’re doing 
your job, there’s something there for everyone to hate you, so you can’t 
worry about it. . . . One of the unfortunate impacts from that election is that 
a lot of people have told me that they have thought of running for the Court 
or other courts, but they changed their minds after watching what I went 
through. 
 
Some Justices discussed the impact of prior challenges to their colleagues’ re-
selection bids.  If anything, these events, although worrisome, caused these Justices to 
“double down” on their resolve to block out any considerations of personal imperilment 
when deciding controversial cases.  And most of these Justices recognized that the prior 
challenges were aberrant events that were not predictive.  One Justice told this story: 
We’ve had some [abortion] cases that we [he and a colleague] knew would 
affect our retention election.  [Another colleague had] squeaked by after 
challenges on abortion cases.  His experience gave us heart that we would 
survive.  We just tried to put it out of our minds.  . . .  We heard rumblings 
about a challenge a few months before the election, so we mobilized by 
getting a group together to run a campaign that used social media.  We were 
then hands off, not doing any editorials and the like.  I had a sense of 
helplessness due to the lack of any real control. 
 
c.  Re-selection does not generally affect how decisions 
are written 
 
When asked whether re-selection events impact how opinions are written, about 
fifty percent of Justices with views answered, “no.”44  One Justice’s response typified 
others:  “It’s not judicial elections.  Is public perception influencing opinions?  Yes.  We’re 
careful to explain and reduce unnecessary flourishes.  No need to use colorful language 
                                                          
44 Four Justices were unsure whether re-selection impacts opinion writing and two 
Justices expressed no opinion. 
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to provoke.  That’s why you find more colorful language in dissents.”  Others echoed this 
sentiment, emphasizing that they endeavor to avoid offending parties or lower courts 
and organize high-interest opinions so lay people can readily understand them.   
The other half of Justices thought that re-selection affects opinion drafting.  Most 
in this group spoke about clarity and tone.  As one thoughtful Justice explained: 
I think we alter the writing by softening the language to make it more 
clearly understood and palatable to the public and our constituents.  But 
there is nothing wrong with that.  I want to leave a good legacy, and I want 
the Court to look great.  I will do an additional concurrence to provide more 
rationale in a softer way when I think the public or media might 
misunderstand the reasons for the majority.  Often, my concurrence might 
be picked up by the press.  Why did I do that?  Maybe to make people think 
I really care about it.  I wouldn’t do any differently if I was a Federal judge.  
We need to make sure that the public has faith in the judiciary. 
 
Some in this group also spoke to the need to handle high public interest cases with 
care.  “With hot button cases, I want to acknowledge the [legitimacy of] the other side,” 
explained one Justice.  So, for example, in overturning a death sentence, he is more likely 
to appease victims by saying something like, “the Court does not take this action lightly.”  
One Justice candidly acknowledged that some decisions issued from his Court are 
written in a way to maximize a Justice’s chances for re-selection: 
Some of what is written is written with the next election in mind, 
particularly in death penalty cases.  One member [of my Court] is always 
intent on writing on death penalty cases as more of a political statement. . . 
. As the election year draws near, his writing becomes more rabid. 
 
He added that “sometimes we can take an issue and something can be written more 
broadly and should be, but instead it’s very, very narrowly tailored to be confined to just 
one case” for fear of public reaction. 
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Language in dissents is sometimes included solely to appease Justices’ supporters.  
These Justices “’wave the bloody flag,’ meaning they play to their group,” said one Justice 
of a few colleagues, “for example decrying that the majority has made a threat to 
democracy.  It’s playing to your base.  Whether done consciously for the election, I’m not 
sure.  It’s just saying to the base, ‘we’re still on your side.’”  Another Justice also noted 
that Justices will occasionally insert “disclaimers” about whether a result reflects a good 
or bad policy, especially when upholding legislation.    
Surprisingly, more than one Justice said that re-selection concerns can muddy 
opinion drafting.  One observed that “if the majority wishes to yield to the public view, 
the decision is typically poorly written and conclusory.  It avoids directly taking on 
precedent that challenges the decision’s outcome.  It just declares the result.”  A scholarly 
Justice who had clearly thought about the issue pointed to Professor (and former 
Arkansas Supreme Court Justice) Robert A. Leflar’s article, “Honest Judicial Opinions,”45 
as evidence that Justices may mask their decisions with vague language, possibly in 
reaction to re-selection concerns.  One Justice expressed more outrage:   
It’s a reality that politics play a role in the judiciary when Justices are 
elected. . . . I’ve been amazed at some of the antics in drafting and crafting 
the opinion to support [a politically popular result].  It goes on during the 
election seasons and in high profile cases like when the governor sues the 
legislature for X power. 
 
One Justice thought that the judicial evaluation process in his state, which goes 
hand-in-hand with re-selection, along with the desire to be good jurists, compels Justices 
                                                          
45 Leflar, Rober A., Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 721, 741 (1979-80). 
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to craft better decisions.  “We always understand we’ll be evaluated on the quality of the 
reasoning [and] writing” in a decision, and “we do take that seriously . . . The desire to 
be a good judge is reinforced by the evaluation system.” 
d.  Re-Selection does not generally tempt Justices to 
recuse from controversial cases 
 
I asked whether the Justices ever suspected that a colleague had recused from a 
controversial case to avoid deciding it before an election.  Overwhelmingly, the answer 
was “no.”  But seven Justices answered “yes.”  In one instance, a Justice was suspicious 
because, “the decision wouldn’t have gone over well in the recusing Justice’s district.”  
Another Justice was more than suspicious when a colleague running in a hotly contested 
partisan re-election bid recused in many cases and sometimes announced ridiculous 
reasons for doing so. 
Of note, one Justice remarked that “the greater infraction is not recusing when you 
should,” stating his belief that some Justices on his Court should have recused from a 
case when seeking re-selection to avoid the perception of impropriety.   
Interestingly, some Justices reported that recusal is much more of an issue with 
judges on lower courts.  As one put it, “[r]ecusals are disfavored at the Supreme Court 
because it has to be explained,” but “I have seen it at the trial level on occasion.”  Three 
Justices said that some of those judges have reportedly recused to avoid deciding 
controversial cases when they were seeking appointment to either the intermediate courts 
of appeal or the Supreme Court.  One said that while he was on an intermediate appellate 
court, “I saw people constantly getting off high profile cases” and noted that this was “a 
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pattern with people applying for this Court.”  Another Justice, who had once served on 
an intermediate appellate court, volunteered that successive chief judges knew when 
people were up for re-selection and purposefully avoided assigning controversial cases 
to those judges’ panels. 
e.  Justices do not generally avoid authoring dissents to 
strategically protect against being singled out for 
possible electoral sanction 
 
In the mid-1980s, Melinda Gann Hall argued that the low dissent rate in state 
Supreme Courts could be explained, in part, by Justices using a strategy of not dissenting 
in cases of high public visibility to avoid being singled out for “possible electoral 
sanction.”46  She theorized as follows:  
For judges, controversial decisions become more difficult to justify on the 
basis of law when they depart from the majority’s decisions and vote in the 
minority.  It can be argued that though voters may accept a legal 
explanation for a unanimous court’s unpopular decision, the mechanism of 
judicial accountability is more rigidly adhered to on issues where voters 
have information and strong preferences and where judges have singled 
themselves out for criticism. 
Therefore it can be hypothesized that justices who strongly desire re-
election and fear the possibility of electoral sanction will not distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the court by dissenting on highly salient 
political questions.  Instead, a justice will either vote with the majority or 
will mask his or her disagreement in a concurrence rather than a dissent.  In 
other words, we should see a higher level of unanimous voting relative to 
an overall pattern on controversial, very visible issues for certain types of 
justices.47 
                                                          
46 Hall, Melinda Gann, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts:  Conceptual Notes and 
a Case Study, The Journal of Politics, Vol., 49, No. 4 at 1117 (Nov. 1987). 
47 Id. at 1119. 
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To test her theory, Hall conducted in-depth, confidential interviews with each 
Justice sitting on the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1983.  Justice “A” told Hall that 
although he “professed a personal abhorrence of executions and the death penalty,” 
because his constituents supported capital punishment and would retaliate against him 
at the polls for taking a contrary view, he did not dissent in cases affirming a defendant’s 
death sentence.48  Indeed, although Justice “A” filed dissents in favor of criminal 
defendants’ claims in 26.0% of non-capital cases decided in a single term, he dissented in 
favor of criminal defendants’ claims in only 3.3% of capital cases decided that term.49 
I related Hall’s findings to the Justices I interviewed and asked whether they had 
seen evidence that Justices avoided being singled out in controversial dissents to 
maximize job security.  The majority answered “no.”  A few took issue with application 
today of Hall’s theory.  As one Justice said:  “With controversial cases, if we have sharply 
different views, we’re more likely to write separately.”  Another Justice expressed a 
similar sentiment:  “I’ve stuck my neck out and so have my colleagues.  We try to find 
consensus where we can on high profile cases but we have no qualms about dissenting.  
But we try to bring folks on board.”  Still another said:  “I wrote a dissent in a case 
concerning the Governor’s desire to put something on the ballot. . . The majority allowed 
it, but I was the lone dissenter.  I didn’t care about going against the grain.” 
Some Justices discussed other reasons for not dissenting even when a Justice 
disagrees with the majority opinion.  “In writing a dissent, a Justice has to pick his battles.  
                                                          
48 Id. at 1120. 
49 Id. at 1122. 
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I don’t see people doing that for political reasons,” said one Justice, while another pointed 
out that “[t]here is no point in dissenting when doing so wouldn’t make a difference.”  
Another Justice addressed the costs of dissenting: 
Stronger forces militate low dissent rates.  Primarily, the culture of the 
court.  Internally, we are collegial and get along.  Being a frequent dissenter 
carries other costs.  It identifies you as someone not effective at getting 
others to agree with you.  Dissention is a concession of defeat.  We’re always 
faced with the quandary of trying to join the majority and trying to make it 
better or exiting and dissenting.  
 
Conversely, a Justice explained an incentive to try and reach consensus:  “Part of the 
calculus is wanting to be part of the majority to temper it.”  And another noted that when 
the opinion is taking a view contrary to public consensus, “[w]e try to be as strong as 
possible to present a united front.” 
One Justice had a unique, and disturbing, explanation for what dissuades some 
Justices from dissenting: 
A bigger problem is that there are some Justices who are perceived as 
persuasive among the public and the legislature.  They have pull.  So, it’s 
more convenient and expected to side with whatever the position is taken 
by those Justices even if justice says otherwise.  And if you’re up [for re-
election] soon and need help from those Justices, you’re likely under 
pressure to agree.  The reason is that this Justice can help with grassroots 
support and getting legislative support.  Statewide elections are expensive.  
If Justices have that kind of pull, the inclination is to vote with them even 
when the Justice’s personal inclination is otherwise. 
  
Another Justice mentioned that his dissent rate was used against him in his re-
election bid.  “When I was attacked in the election, [my opponent] said I was an outlier 
and he counted the dissents and tried to use it against me.  He also tried to use it to show 
I wasn’t liked by the Court.” 
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 Several Justices reported evidence supporting Hall’s theory.  Most of these Justices 
reported conversations had with Justices from other Courts.  One Justice said: 
I’ve attended national events.  In private discussion with other judges, some 
who are elected are very concerned about voter reaction.  I remember one 
judge saying that if a dissent wouldn’t matter, why bother dissenting if it 
would only impact re-election chances.  That makes me glad that [my state] 
doesn’t have partisan elections. 
 
Another Justice had a similar experience, observing that “[c]ourt culture varies.  A judge 
from another state once candidly told me that he had to decide a case a certain way 
because he had an election coming up.  I was shocked.” 
 Some Justices reported first-hand experiences that supported Hall’s theory.  One 
Justice complained that the electoral process “incentivizes Justices to refrain from 
expressing an unpopular opinion.”  He resists this temptation: 
I try to write dissents/concurrences all the time if warranted.  I do know 
that some colleagues feel differently because they don’t want to highlight 
that the majority thinks their position defective.  I don’t feel that way.  If 
people want to judge me, I want them to judge me on what I decide.  I’m 
not enthusiastic about consensus.  I won’t dissent just to embarrass 
someone, but I will if I feel strongly on an issue. 
 
f.  Courts rarely delay the release of opinions preceding 
an election 
 
 Most Justices reported that they had not seen a controversial opinion’s release 
delayed in the weeks before an election.  But several Justices recalled instances when this 
occurred.  Some Courts openly discussed the practice.  “I don’t remember which [case, 
but] I remember discussions about the appropriateness of releasing an opinion before an 
election,” remarked one Justice.  Another Justice stated that “I’ve seen people hold them 
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and, at least twice, the Justices were candid in saying that the case is controversial, and 
the Justice is going to hold it until after the election.”  This practice is justified, explained 
a Justice, to “avoid releasing cases that would cast a Justice up for retention in a bad 
light.”  Another Court discussed the matter and held a “number of cases” before an 
election over the objection of one of the Justices I interviewed. 
 In other Courts, the practice of delaying opinion releases is not discussed but 
sometimes occurs at the authoring Justice’s behest.  And a few Justices said they had 
suspected that a colleague had “sat” on a case to avoid releasing it before an election.  
“I’ve noted a time or two that the case is held a little bit longer than necessary,” 
commented a Justice, who echoed others.  One Justice reported observing more blatant 
displays: 
I see decisions get right to the point of issuance and then pulled from the 
[release list] because an election is impending.  I’ve also seen how an 
individual on the Court seeking a federal appointment handled a 
controversial case.  The decision was ready to go, but all of a sudden he 
pulled it from the [list] to “study it.”  It’s still being studied and he’s 
awaiting the outcome of the appointment. 
     
 A few Justices reported knowing that decisions were delayed in lower courts.   One 
Justice said that a trial court judge he knew continued sentencing in a death penalty case 
past an election date.  After that judge was re-elected, he imposed a non-death sentence, 
which caused a “hue and cry” among his constituents.  Interestingly, he also knew of a 
court of appeals judge who timed releases of controversial opinions for a day least likely 
to garner press coverage. 
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g.  Justices are divided on what the best methods are 
for their selection and re-selection 
 
 Reminiscent of the historical fluctuations in opinion about the best way to select 
and re-select state court judges, no consensus emerged from the Justices on this topic.  
Unsurprisingly, most Justices favored their own systems (they worked well for them, 
after all) and pointed out flaws in other states’ methods. 
 Justices in retention/re-appointment states questioned the wisdom of permitting 
voters to select judges.  One Justice viewed voters as unqualified to make these decisions:   
Notwithstanding that Jefferson railed against the provision that provided 
for lifetime appointments, if he was alive today, he would disagree with 
this former stance.  Electing judges is the worst idea.  Lay people aren’t 
qualified to decide if judicial candidates are qualified.  And they have no 
real undersetting that most laws protecting rights, most notably state and 
federal bill of rights, are designed to be counter-majoritarian.  And that’s 
antithetical to the notion that it’s a good idea to elect judges. 
 
 Justices in this group more frequently lamented the campaign fundraising 
attendant to partisan and non-partisan elections.  A Justice who had formerly run in 
partisan elections as a trial court judge commented, “I know from experience that the 
people who want to give money are lawyers and corporate entities.  So that’s the danger.  
You have to raise big bucks to run.” Other Justices questioned the independence of 
Justices in states with partisan and non-partisan elections.  One recalled his experiences 
as a trial lawyer practicing in multiple jurisdictions: 
[M]y track record with partisan-elected judges was worse than with 
retention-election judges.  I think there was a bit of “pay to play.”  I walked 
into one courtroom in Texas and all the attorneys were talking about 
whether they were current in their contributions to the judge.  The judge 




 One Justice’s experience as a lawyer litigating a series of education-issue cases 
before another state’s Supreme Court during an election year made him a life-long 
advocate of merit selection: 
We went to the [state] supreme court [multiple] times.  We watched the 
results carefully and actively encouraged people to make contributions to 
the candidate that favored our position.  All the decisions in our cases were 
[close calls] and a change of one Justice would have made a difference.  
There was absolutely no question that the election would decide our case.  
[The Justices we backed] won and we won.  I have become such a militant 
about merit selection as a result. 
 
 Retention-election states were also criticized for the potential influence of funded 
campaigns.  Justices from those states that have not had challenges mounted against 
sitting colleagues nevertheless expressed concern about future challenges.  “In [my state], 
we’ve been lucky by not having high-dollar campaigns against anyone [standing for 
retention],” remarked one Justice, but he worried how such challenges would impact his 
Court.  “I would hope Justices would [still] call them like they see them.”  Regardless of 
the possibilities of challenges, most Justices in retention states don’t mount campaigns.  
This Justice’s laissez-faire attitude was typical: 
One Justice told me [in the year of my retention bid] that I should do 
nothing because there is nothing to do.  [My state] is a huge state, so what 
am I going to productively do?  I could spend a lot of time raising $1 million, 
but that won’t go far.  And who is going to raise money to beat me?  And 
to what end?  Just to appoint someone else like me? Structural factors 
militate against a Justice making any effort in a re-election unless he hears 
of a campaign. 
 
 Justices in retention-election states generally opined that retention elections strike 
the right balance because they permit people to have some voice in judicial re-selection 
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and take political pressure off the judicial system.  “Having a retention election, merit 
system, is a liberating factor,” said one Justice, “you don’t have to worry about how a 
decision impacts you personally.  I would like to hope that Justices in partisan election 
states don’t worry about it, but that would be naïve.”  Another Justice agreed, saying that 
“[m]erit selection for the most part eliminates” the concern about elections influencing 
decisions.  He acknowledged that “our system, although not perfect, avoids some of the 
pitfalls that elected systems have.” 
 Justices in partisan and non-partisan election states acknowledged that some 
influences exist due to elections (“Does the Court change during an election year?  Yes.”).    
One Justice said about the impact of elections: 
I’ve heard other judges and Justices say, “I can’t do that because an election 
is coming up” and that’s frightening to me.  It’s alarming and I respond 
that people would respect the integrity behind the decision even if they 
disagree with the result.  I also ask them whether, regardless, they feel they 
have an obligation to do what they think is right.  The prevailing answer 
is “but I have to think about my own election.”  I’ve heard this from judges 
and Justices in other states as well. 
 
This sentiment was echoed by other Justices.  “One Justice [on my Court] has said that 
my constituents want me to vote for it, so that’s the second reason for voting for it,” 
related a Justice.  A Justice in a partisan-election state related that a trial court judge 
recently called him upset about the “overwhelming” backlash he got from his supporters 
for holding a police officer in contempt because they thought it would hurt his re-election 
chances.  “[That judge’s] circumstance is typical.” 




I think there are virtues with electing Justices.  But the problem with 
elections is (a) Justices actually adjusting a decision to satisfy the electorate 
or contributors, and (b) a perception that this is what occurs.  And there are 
concerns about where the campaign contributions come from.  I’m more 
certain that the appearance problem is the real concern.  . . .  When there is 
a decision with political impact, the media reports the party affiliation of 
the Justices.  For example, they say “three Republicans voted one way and 
four Democrats voted the other,” which perpetuates the perception that 
party affiliation drives the decision. 
 
 But many Justices in partisan and non-partisan election states touted popular 
elections over retention and re-appointment systems.  One Justice in a non-partisan 
election state decried the “political litmus test” that exists when a Justice is appointed.  
He was once asked by his state governor whether the latter’s vacancy-filling 
appointments to the appellate courts needed to be more balanced.  The Justice candidly 
told him, “yes.”  He elaborated: 
Ninety percent of appellate judges here start with an appointment. . . . In 
my state . . . one [political] party has run the table for so long.  Almost all 
the political weight is behind the scenes in the appointment selection 
process.  You just know that the governor will select someone who is 
passionate about how to decide things a particular way.  Governors appoint 
“fellow travelers” and judges are in denial about how objective they are. . . 
.  Some Justices on the Court wouldn’t have been appointed by a governor 
because they are independent in their decisions.  But they’re on because 
they won an election. 
 
Others were likewise concerned with being “beholden” to an appointing authority.  “The 
initial reaction of a new Justice is to stay close to the ideology of the appointing 
authority,” observed one Justice when discussing his Court’s mid-term appointees.  
“Maybe the further the Justice gets in time from the appointment, he or she might go 
away from that.  People do that.  When the Justice gains a sense of independence from 
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the executive branch, he or she is more likely to decide the case only on the law.”   Two 
Justices drew on their own experience to emphasize this point.  The first recounted: 
Having been through two elections and one appointment, I found the 
appointment process just as political but behind closed doors.  You would 
never be appointed in [my state] if [you are a member of] a different party 
from the governor.  The voters are more engaged and wanting to know 
about the candidate and that’s more refreshing. . . . Since Citizens United, 
there are more opportunities for outside groups to influence the election.  
Scary.  But they influence the appointment process, too.  The voters, like 
juries, do the right thing. 
 
And the second Justice concurred: 
 
I wouldn’t want a lifetime appointment.  I don’t believe in appointments.  
I’ve been elected [multiple] times and through the appointment process 
[multiple] times.  There are more politics in the appointment process.  Only 
the governor appoints with no citizen nominating commission. 
 
. . . . 
 
I’m not fond of the appointment process. … I also don’t like retention 
because both sides might want to vote you out.  I would rather have a flesh 
and blood opponent.   
 
 Many Justices in this group also applauded that elected Justices are more 
accountable to and in touch with the public.  These comments are representative: 
I think state court judges are also people who are active and known in their 
respective districts and counties.  I’m not a fan of our current U.S. Supreme 
Court because they’re out of touch. 
 
. . . . 
 
I have to raise money here, and I don’t like it, but I do the best I can to do it 
right.  The good things about the electoral process is that I have to go among 
the people of the state, I have to hear about what people are concerned 
with—not in the sense of casting votes.  People want judges who are 
honorable and run a system that keeps them safe.  The thought that a judge 
can ignore sentiments, the opinions of the public, that’s not a good thing.  
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It’s healthy to have honorable judges, raising money appropriately, and 
deciding cases responsibly. 
 
. . . . 
 
My observation is that some of the most politically unpopular and arguably 
wrong decisions have been made by unelected judges, primarily federal 
judges.  Without some type of accountability, some of these judges feel 
empowered, apparently, to do what they want. 
 
 Unique in his comment, one Justice welcomed the prospect of an ineffective 
colleague being given the boot by voters: 
With elections, there’s some accountability.  It might not necessarily be 
better.  . . .  Sometimes I saw Justices that I was glad would probably only 
serve one term.  There are lots of problems with lifetime appointment. . . If 
perfect people were in the job with a lifetime appointment, it would 
probably be great.  But that’s not going to happen.  
 
 And at least one Justice didn’t blink about being affiliated with a political party.  
“Shouldn’t the public know about candidates?  Isn’t there a benefit to people to know 
about political affiliation?” he inquired.  “It’s not a hard and fast way to predict votes, 
but it’s useful information in light of the political decisions sometimes made,” he 
concluded.   
 Justices from every system reported concerns about the increase of outside 
funding affecting a Justice’s re-selection bid.  The combination of Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (lifting restrictions on independent expenditures by 
organizations communicating about a candidate) and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (striking matching funds provision of 
state public campaign financing act) has been “problematic,” bemoaned a Justice in a 
partisan-election state.  He described the first Supreme Court race in his state after those 
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decisions, wherein a single outside entity raised more than $3 million to defeat the 
candidate whose hands were tied by the public financing system.  “After Citizens United, 
more money poured into [my state’s] court races.  Despite the group’s agenda, they 
usually pick a hot-button social issue to attack with, usually tarring the Justice by saying 
he helps criminals.  Everyone who runs dreads the prospect of being a target.” 
 Citizens United was brought up several times in the interviews and never in a 
positive light.  A Justice in a sparsely populated state still favored the electoral process 
but lamented the changes wrought by Citizens United: 
The election process has changed here, as it has in other states.  The outside 
groups, because of Citizens United, give independent expenditures.  This is 
a cheap media market and a small state, so a little goes a long way.  
Advocacy groups . . .  have been here for three cycles unsuccessfully.  It has 
changed the election process quite a lot because candidates are now 
required to raise more money whereas before they didn’t.  Also, now there 
are more contested elections. 
 
 A Justice in a retention-election state noted a year in which “[t]here was a 
concerted effort to run off several Supreme Court Justices” by people outside the state.  
Although the effort was unsuccessful, it lowered the typical retention percentages.  “The 
people behind [the campaign] disappeared.”  Another Justice lamented the difficulty of 
raising money for a retention election when there is no opponent, making it more difficult 
to counter challenges. 
 Despite the pitfalls of each type of selection and re-selection system, most Justices 
did not think their Courts would operate differently if Justices had life tenures.  A Justice 
who later served in the federal judiciary expressed doubt whether the state Supreme 
Court would change if Justices were given life tenure:  “I’ve served with federal judges 
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who still bowed to majority view and didn’t want to be considered too liberal or too 
conservative.”   
 To my surprise, many Justices did not want life tenure.  Most, like this Justice, 
preferred a system that holds a Justice accountable for his performance: 
I think in general terms, we should hold judges accountable for what they 
do.  We want judges who make good decisions on the law, have the ability 
to write, and who conduct themselves with integrity.  We need a system 
that insures that judges perform how we want them to while minimizing 
political influence.  Justices need to call it like they see it without political 
factors weighing them down.  We need to insulate judges without losing 
accountability. . . .  There are always folks who might struggle in a 
particular area.  If they are struggling, we need a process to help 
improvement and then hold these Justices accountable if they don’t 
improve. 
 
Another Justice thought the electoral process improved his judicial performance: 
The electoral process is an accountability tool.  I wouldn’t be here if it didn’t 
exist.  I disagreed with the former Chief Justice so I ran against him.  My 
awareness of the other branches’ concerns and the community’s concerns 
is broader for running.  It means you write a better opinion because you 
have these concerns in mind.  The decision doesn’t change, though. 
 
 Some Justices also expressed discomfort with unchecked decision-making.  For 
example, one offered his opinion that, “state judges are more reasonable than federal 
judges, not as pompous.  I wouldn’t want to become that.”  Another commented that he 
sees “activist judges” in the federal courts because they aren’t accountable.  “Most of us 
think being closer to the people is good,” remarked another.  And another believed that 
lifetime appointments cause federal judges to lose their “filters” and “say whatever pops 
into their heads.”   
39 
 
 A few Justices thought that the culture of their Courts might change if they were 
appointed for life, like federal judges.  One Justice said he and his colleagues might be 
less sensitive or less empathetic and more outspoken like some federal judges, thereby 
affecting how decisions are written but not how they are decided.  A thoughtful Justice 
supposed that a life tenure would cause the Justices to perceive themselves as more 
independent.  He thought that federal judges know this internally.  “It’s more talked 
about in terms of a tradition, i.e., the tradition of the federal judiciary.”  This unrestrained 
independence may also exist among Justices serving in their last terms.  One such Justice 
reported that his colleague, also in his last term, commented that “we both have a free 
shot to do what we want to.” 
h.  Good character is the key characteristic for an 
independent Justice 
 
  Although I did not ask about key characteristics for high-caliber Justices, the topic 
of “character” continuously popped up when discussing the pressures placed on Justices 
by the re-selection process.  This Justice’s comment echoed others:  “It takes character to 
be a judge.  He or she must ‘compartmentalize’ the outside, personal concerns to make 
decisions that they might not even like.”  Another phrased it this way: 
If you put honorable people on the court, who understand the rule of law, 
they would more likely make decisions without considering how it might 
impact their chances for re-election.  If you put people of lesser capabilities 
on the bench, maybe you would get a different result.  There is always a 
temptation to change a bad policy, but we don’t have the authority to 
change it.  The answer to the problem is to structure the system of selecting 
judges in such a way to make sure that the best people available are the 




A federal judge who used to sit on a state intermediate court of appeals was candid in his 
views: 
I think there is risk that [the possibility of losing a re-selection bid] would 
impact decision making.  It has a lot to do with the integrity of the judge.  
As a former state court judge, there is no way you can’t not think that your 
job is at issue.  It risks affecting the substance of the opinion and definitely 
does affect the logic of the decision and perhaps its timing of release.  The 
risks are there; it just depends on the integrity of the Justice to do what’s 
right. 
 
 Some Justices mentioned other important characteristics for Justices.  “The take 
away,” said one Justice, “is that we should always have people on the bench who don’t 
really want the job so much that they’ll compromise their views to retain it.  The best 
judges are the ones who know they can make a living elsewhere.”  Another noted that 
Justices who view themselves as politicians are more likely to vote in a way to maximize 
their chances of re-selection.  He recalled sitting on an education panel with a Georgia 
judge and thinking, “how can he talk like a politician?”  
 A few Justices proposed taking the pressure off them by having longer terms.  
Justices with longer terms uniformly felt less anxious than Justices with shorter terms.   
“The prospect of losing is so remote, temporally,” said one, “that you don’t really think 
about it.”  But even longer terms don’t fully immunize Justices from the anxiety of re-
selection.  One Justice with a long term related that a colleague is running in a non-
partisan election in 2020 “and he is now mentioning it all the time, so he’s worried.” 
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B.  Empirical evidence:  dissents and special concurrences 
The Sub-Hypothesis:    The re-selection processes used 
for sitting state Supreme Court Justices encourage those 
Justices to act strategically in dissenting and specially 
concurring to maximize their prospects of maintaining 
their positions. 
 
There has been an abundance of literature suggesting that elections may influence 
judicial decision-making, especially in criminal cases.50  The majority of Justices I 
interviewed vehemently denied that the prospect of losing their jobs influenced their 
decisions.  But many candidly admitted that they can’t help but consider whether some 
decisions will hurt their chances for being re-selected.  Do Justices’ personal worries 
subconsciously impact their decisions? 
To answer that question, which would further support or defeat my major 
hypothesis, I created the above sub-hypothesis.  To test it, I examined whether the 
prospect of losing an upcoming re-selection bid impacts a Justice’s decision to dissent or 
specially concur.  The primary reason for a Justice to do so is disagreement with the 
majority about its conclusion or reasoning.  As Hall found, however, some Justices may 
choose not to dissent when doing so would express an unpopular public view and would 
not affect the case outcome.  And in my interviews, some Justices said they sometimes 
preferred to write separately to more clearly explain decisions to the voting public.  If re-
selection concerns indeed influence Justices in deciding whether to dissent or specially 
                                                          
50 See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 839. 
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concur, either consciously or subconsciously, we should detect different patterns in the 
years preceding and following a re-selection event. 
1.  Methodology 
 
     To determine whether Justices’ behaviors in dissenting or specially concurring are 
influenced by the prospect of a re-selection event, I first identified the Justices who were 
re-selected in 2014 and served for a full year thereafter.  I then excluded Justices 
appointed less than one year before an election.  Sixty-Five Justices comprise the group 
examined. 
 I chose 2014 for a few reasons.  Re-selection events that year occurred after the 
highly publicized 2010 Iowa retention election in which three Justices on the Iowa 
Supreme Court lost their seats in the wake of that Court’s controversial same-sex 
marriage opinion.  That event sent shockwaves through many merit-selection states, 
where Justices had believed that retention elections were only lost when a Justice suffered 
some type of personal downfall, like excessive drinking or gambling.  Also, by 2014, 
Justices seeking re-selection were sometimes confronted with well-funded opposition 
campaigns by groups with agendas, which raised real concerns that Justices could lose 
their positions for making unpopular decisions.  In short, the atmosphere present in the 
years immediately before and after the 2014 re-selection events are like those that exist 
today, making the findings more relevant.   
 I performed Westlaw searches to count the number of dissents/special 
concurrences authored or joined by the Justices one year before and one year after their 
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re-selection.  Partial dissents and partial concurrences were counted as “dissents/special 
concurrences.”  I then calculated the percentages of total cases decided in which the 
Justices dissented/specially concurred in each year and recorded the percentage 
variances.51  I separately recorded variances in dissent/special concurrence rates in 
criminal cases because “tough on crime” was a common campaign theme in 2014,52 and 
criminal cases often grabbed public attention, which may have tempted Justices to treat 
these cases differently.  Juvenile delinquency cases based on criminal acts were included 
in the criminal case type.  Finally, I assigned each Justice a number and identified their 
method of reselection:  partisan election (“PE”), non-partisan election (“NPE”), retention 
election (“RE”), and re-appointment by a government entity (“REAPPT”) to discern the 
impact of re-selection methods.  
 Table 1 shows the list of sixty-five Justices, their methods of re-selection, the 
percentages of cases in which they authored or joined a dissent/special concurrence the 
year before (“year 1”) and the year after (“year 2”) re-selection, the percentage variance 
between the years, and the variance rate for dissents/special concurrences in criminal 
cases (“CR”).  For the Justices serving on Courts that do not hear criminal cases, “n/a” is 
noted in the column recording criminal case variance rates. 
 Studying the information for Justice 1 aids in reading Table 1.  Justice 1 was re-
selected in a partisan election.  He dissented/specially concurred in 73.91% of the cases 
he decided in the year before his election and did so in 74.28% of the cases in the year 
                                                          
51  The total cases decided each year excluded cases in which the Justice was recused. 
52 Greytak, supra note 29, at 3. 
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following the election, meaning he dissented/specially concurred .37% more in the year 
following the election.  But he dissented/specially concurred 20.56% fewer times in 
criminal cases the year following the election. 
 Tables 2 through 4 isolate the information in Table 1 by method of re-selection.  
Those tables should be read in the same manner as Table 1.    
2.  Results and analysis 
 
 As with many statistical studies, the results should be read keeping in mind that 
the below-reported variance rates are not based on large numbers.  Most of the sixty-five 
Justices whose dissent/special concurrence patterns I studied belonged to Courts which 
decided fewer than 100 cases both the year before and the year after the 2014 re-selection 
event.  And the number of dissents/special concurrences in a studied year ranged from 
zero to thirty-three.  In my experience, these numbers are typical.  These relatively low 
numbers make it difficult to put significant weight on statistical variances in 
dissent/special concurrence rates.  But examining variance rates adds a sliver of light in 
testing the hypothesis. 
 Assuming that a 5% variance in the percentage of dissents/special concurrences 
written or joined in the years before and after a re-selection event is statistically 
significant, three conclusions can be drawn from the information set forth in Table 1. 
 First, although most Justices’ dissent/special concurrence patterns for all case 
types did not vary greatly in the year before and the year after re-selection events, about 
one-third of the Justices’ patterns varied by statistically significant percentages.  Twenty-
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four Justices had a variance equal to or greater than 5%.  See Figure 1.53  Interestingly, 
among that group, nineteen Justices dissented/specially concurred in a smaller 
percentage of cases the year after a re-selection event.  See Figure 2.  This fact confirms 
Justices’ comments in interviews that they were sometimes motivated to write separately 
to better explain their decisions to the voting public or others responsible for their re-
appointment. 
Figure 1 





                                                          
53 Figure 1 shows the percentage variances for all case types from the year before a re-
selection event and the year after.  Positive numbers indicate that a greater percentage of 
dissents/special concurrences were filed the year after a re-selection event and negative 
numbers indicate that a smaller percentage were filed in the year after a re-selection 


















 Second, as with the figure for all case types, most Justices’ dissent/special 
concurrence patterns in criminal cases did not vary significantly.  See Figure 3.  Only 
fifteen Justices had a variance equal to or greater than 5%.  Eleven of those Justices 
dissented/specially concurred in a smaller percentage of cases during the year after the 
re-selection event than before.  See Figure 4.  This pattern further supports the idea that 
a Justice may write separately more often before a re-selection event than after to better 
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See Tables 2−4.  Nine of the thirteen Justices re-elected in partisan races had variances 
equal to or greater than 5%.  And all but one Justice wrote or joined a smaller percentage 
of dissents/special concurrences in the year after the election.  See Figure 5.  Similarly, 
five of the nine Justices who decided criminal cases had variances equal to or greater than 
5% and predominantly filed a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences in the 
year after the election.  See Figure 6. 
Figure 5 
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 Justices re-selected in non-partisan elections had fewer percentage variances than 
their peers running in partisan elections.  Only six of the twenty-one Justices in this group 
had variances of 5% or more.  Of these six, true to the emerging pattern, five wrote or 
joined in a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences during the year after the 
election.  See Figure 7.  Examining dissents/special concurrences in criminal cases 
yielded similar results.  Only four of the Justices had variances equal to or greater than 
5% with three writing or joining a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences in 
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variance rates equal to or greater than 5%.  Six of these nine wrote or joined in a smaller 
percentage of dissents/special concurrences in the year following re-selection.  See Figure 
9.  Similarly, only six Justices had variances rates equal to or greater than 5% in criminal 
cases, with half writing or joining more dissents/special concurrences before the re-
selection event and half after the event.  See Figure 10.  
Figure 9 





















 The data suggests that the sub-hypothesis is true for many Justices but not the 
majority.  It also appears that Justices who ran in partisan elections were more apt to 
consider an upcoming election when deciding whether to write or join a dissent/special 
concurrence than Justices re-selected using other methods.  Finally, the Justices who had 
a percentage variance of 5% or more tended to write or join a smaller percentage of 
dissents/special concurrences the year following re-selection.  This finding evidences 
what some Justices related in the interviews about their preferences to write separately 

















 The anecdotal information gained through the interviews and the empirical data 
obtained by examining dissent/special concurrence rates in the years immediately 
preceding and following 2014 re-selection events suggest that the major hypothesis is 
true.  But while re-selection events may create a temptation for Justices to make decisions 
in a way that preserves their positions, it is a temptation that is generally ignored.   
 Justices’ concerns about keeping their jobs are omnipresent, but most have come 
to terms with the prospect of losing their jobs and use tactics to compartmentalize their 
personal welfare concerns when making decisions.  These Justices can prioritize the 
importance of the rule of law and an independent judiciary.  Other Justices slip from time 
to time, particularly in the run up to a re-selection event, and are consciously or 
unconsciously strategic in their decision making. 
 Although the empirical data regarding dissents/special concurrences suggests 
that Justices who run in partisan elections are most at risk for yielding to the temptation 
to act with personal benefits in mind, all Justices subject to re-selection are at risk.  The 
character of the Justice predicts whether he can resist the temptation. 
 Further study on the risk to judicial independence from re-selection methods is 
warranted.  Although I interviewed more than 10% of sitting Justices from various areas 
of the country and with different re-selection methods, I did not contact Justices from 
every state.  Additional interviews could reveal different themes and bolster ones 
described in this paper. 
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 More crucially, gathering additional empirical evidence about dissent/special 
concurrence rates in the year before a re-selection event and the year after would solidify 
(or dispel) my findings.  Because Supreme Courts decide relatively few cases each year, 
and thus afford few opportunities for disagreement, it would be beneficial to examine 
dissent/special concurrence variance rates surrounding multiple re-selection event 
years.  In that way, we could determine whether the patterns existing in relation to 2014 
re-selection events hold true.  It would also be helpful to compare variance rates from 
modern times, say 2000 onward, with those from prior decades.  If differences emerge, 
we could correlate the results with evidence of increased attacks on Justices, larger overall 
campaign expenditures, and the like, to discern their impact. 
 Finally, although I did not set out to pinpoint the best method to select and re-
select state Supreme Court Justices, I inevitably added to my own opinions on the subject.  
Each method enables the public or appointing authority to place Justices of good 
character on the bench, and character is the finest predictor of an appropriately 
independent jurist.  But I entered this effort favoring merit selection, and I continue to 
favor that system as the most prudent, albeit not perfect, way to balance public 
accountability with judicial independence.  Life appointments lack any method of public 
accountability while partisan and non-partisan elections are more likely than merit 
selection to threaten a Justice’s job merely for making an unpopular decision.  The 
increase in attack ads in all re-elections, including retention elections, clouds the public’s 
judgment of a Justice, making it more difficult to identify those Justices who deserve 
another term due to their merit and character.  Adherents to any system, other than life 
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appointment, should consider ways to minimize the pressures brought by re-selection 
events when contemplating improvements. 
 Reformers should consider aspects of Hawaii’s method for re-selecting Justices.  
There, after serving a ten-year term, a Justice must apply to be retained by the same 
nonpartisan judicial selection commission that nominated him for appointment by the 
Governor.54  The year before a Justice seeks retention, he is rated by the bar association, 
and the commission consults multiple sources in the community about the Justice’s 
performance.  The Justice is also interviewed by the commission, which reportedly 
understands that Justices often making tough decisions.  This system has the advantage 
of holding a Justice accountable for his performance while seemingly reducing the risk 
he will not be retained for making a controversial decision.  The drawback is that the 
information gathered by the commission is confidential and not subject to public scrutiny, 
which risks public distrust in the system.55  
 Having an independent commission deciding whether a Justice should be retained 
based on merit-based information actively gathered from multiple sources and with 
broad community input would (1) reassure the Justice that he will not suffer retribution 
for making a divisive decision, thereby removing the temptation to act to preserve his 
job, and (2) yet make the Justice accountable for a poor job performance.  The information 
gathered in the re-selection process should, to the extent possible, be open to public 
                                                          
54 See https://courts.state.hi.us/courts/judicial_selection _commission (last visited 
March 15, 2018) 
55 Hayden, Sara, Electing the Bench:  An Analysis of the Possible Negative Effects of Judicial 
Elections on Hawai’i’s Legal Community, 18 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 114, 141 (2016). 
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scrutiny.  And robust judicial performance review measures should be put into place and 
the results published to both provide a consistent assessment of Justices’ performances 






Table 1:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates 
year before/after 2014 re-selection event 












1 PE 73.91 74.28 0.37 -20.56 
2 RE 4.79 2.5 -2.29 -0.24 
3 RE 0 3.84 3.84 0 
4 NPE 8.69 7.69 -1 4.34 
5 PE 51.85 32 
-
19.85 -26.46 
6 RE 22.91 19.14 -3.77 0.22 
7 RE 34.69 23.4 
-
11.29 -1.08 
8 RE 8.97 22 13.03 8.16 
9 RE 0 4 4 2 
10 NPE 9.6 13.86 4.26 0.53 
11 NPE 6.89 7 -0.11 3.42 
12 NPE 2.4 3.03 0.63 2.23 
13 NPE 2.38 3.79 1.52 1.26 
14 NPE 5.95 3.79 2.16 1.34 
15 PE 14.7 11.11 3.59 6.05 
16 RE 12.19 23.07 10.88 2.56 
17 RE 9.75 10.25 0.5 5.38 
18 RE 4.49 15 3.34 8.84 
19 RE 16.85 18.64 1.75 2.18 
20 NPE 16.41 2.7 13.71 7.6 
21 NPE 23.88 4.05 19.83 10.73 
22 NPE 14.92 1.35 13.57 8.95 
23 NPE 0 0 0 0 
24 REAPPT 4.68 4.54 0.14 1.56 
25 RE 15.25 24.52 9.27 3 
26 PE 18.42 13.33 5.09 1.23 
27 PE 32.43 13.33 18.97 7.33 
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28 NPE 10.16 8.33 1.83 3.31 
29 NPE 13.55 28.33 14.78 9.95 
30 RE 33.33 8 25.33 8.5 
31 RE 36 4 32 28 
32 NPE 10.71 11.34 0.63 0.69 
33 NPE 5.71 7.8 2.09 0.7 
34 RE 0 1.69 1.69 0 
35 NPE 4.98 6.72 1.74 1.18 
36 NPE 4.25 4 0.25 0 
37 REAPPT 7.81 8.45 0.64 3.12 
38 RE 1.85 1.96 0.11 0.11 
39 PE 26.31 14.28 12.03 5.76 
40 PE 13.63 13.33 0.3 4.65 
41 PE 9.09 2.22 6.87 2.22 
42 PE 27.27 22.22 5.05 2.02 
43 NPE 18.75 14.89 3.86 0.86 
44 NPE 18.55 15.62 2.93 0.16 
45 RE 44.44 25.92 18.52 0 
46 RE 10.34 10.34 0 0 
47 RE 55.17 40 15.17 0 
48 RE 66.66 10 50.66 50.66 
49 RE 5.08 2.17 2.91 0 
50 RE 11.86 10.86 1 3.61 
51 RE 4.25 0.91 3.34 2.12 
52 RE 3.44 0 3.44 3.44 
53 RE 1.06 1.9 0.84 0.11 
54 RE 2.27 3.22 0.95 0.95 
55 RE 0 1.63 1.63 0 
56 PE 5.66 3.7 1.96 n/a 
57 PE 11.53 0 11.53 n/a 
58 PE 18.96 7.4 11.56 n/a 
59 PE 11.32 5.26 6.06 n/a 
60 RE 6.66 17.46 3.32 0.16 
61 NPE 23.72 8.45 15.27 0.55 
62 NPE 18.64 18.3 0.34 4.2 
63 NPE 22.03 16.9 5.13 0.6 
64 RE 0 1.26 1.26 0 
65 RE 1.29 0.63 0.66 0.64 
59 
 
Table 2:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year 






2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
1 PE 73.91 74.28 0.37 -20.56 
5 PE 51.85 32 -19.85 -26.46 
15 PE 14.7 11.11 -3.59 -6.05 
26 PE 18.42 13.33 -5.09 -1.23 
27 PE 32.43 13.33 -18.97 -7.33 
39 PE 26.31 14.28 -12.03 -5.76 
40 PE 13.63 13.33 -0.3 -4.65 
41 PE 9.09 2.22 -6.87 -2.22 
42 PE 27.27 22.22 -5.05 2.02 
56 PE 5.66 3.7 -1.96 n/a 
57 PE 11.53 0 -11.53 n/a 
58 PE 18.96 7.4 -11.56 n/a 






Table 3:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year 






2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
4 NPE 8.69 7.69 -1 4.34 
10 NPE 9.6 13.86 4.26 0.53 
11 NPE 6.89 7 -0.11 3.42 
12 NPE 2.4 3.03 0.63 2.23 
13 NPE 2.38 3.79 1.52 1.26 
14 NPE 5.95 3.79 -2.16 1.34 
20 NPE 16.41 2.7 -13.71 -7.6 
21 NPE 23.88 4.05 -19.83 -10.73 
22 NPE 14.92 1.35 -13.57 -8.95 
23 NPE 0 0 0 0 
28 NPE 10.16 8.33 -1.83 3.31 
29 NPE 13.55 28.33 14.78 9.95 
32 NPE 10.71 11.34 0.63 0.69 
33 NPE 5.71 7.8 2.09 0.7 
35 NPE 4.98 6.72 1.74 1.18 
36 NPE 4.25 4 -0.25 0 
43 NPE 18.75 14.89 -3.86 -0.86 
44 NPE 18.55 15.62 -2.93 0.16 
61 NPE 23.72 8.45 -15.27 0.55 
62 NPE 18.64 18.3 -0.34 4.2 





Table 4:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year 







2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
2 RE 4.79 2.5 -2.29 -0.24 
3 RE 0 3.84 3.84 0 
6 RE 22.91 19.14 -3.77 0.22 
7 RE 34.69 23.4 -11.29 -1.08 
8 RE 8.97 22 13.03 8.16 
9 RE 0 4 4 2 
16 RE 12.19 23.07 10.88 2.56 
17 RE 9.75 10.25 0.5 5.38 
18 RE 4.49 15 3.34 8.84 
19 RE 16.85 18.64 1.75 -2.18 
24 REAPPT 4.68 4.54 -0.14 -1.56 
25 RE 15.25 24.52 9.27 -3 
30 RE 33.33 8 -25.33 -8.5 
31 RE 36 4 -32 -28 
34 RE 0 1.69 -1.69 0 
37 REAPPT 7.81 8.45 0.64 -3.12 
38 RE 1.85 1.96 0.11 0.11 
45 RE 44.44 25.92 -18.52 0 
46 RE 10.34 10.34 0 0 
47 RE 55.17 40 -15.17 0 
48 RE 66.66 10 -50.66 -50.66 
49 RE 5.08 2.17 -2.91 0 
50 RE 11.86 10.86 -1 3.61 
51 RE 4.25 0.91 -3.34 -2.12 
52 RE 3.44 0 -3.44 -3.44 
53 RE 1.06 1.9 0.84 -0.11 
54 RE 2.27 3.22 0.95 0.95 
55 RE 0 1.63 1.63 0 
60 RE 6.66 17.46 3.32 -0.16 
64 RE 0 1.26 1.26 0 
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